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Do Local Elites Capture Natural Disaster Reconstruction Funds? 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the allocation of natural disaster reconstruction funds among 
cyclone victims in rural Fiji. During post-emergency periods, when good information 
about cyclone damage is available, do local elites, a powerful minority, capture housing 
construction materials? With effective targeting in both receipt and the amount received, 
local elites do not capture larger benefits. More severely affected victims are not early 
recipients, though, because the supply of reconstruction funds is limited during early 
periods. This invites early capture: Traditional kin elites receive benefits earlier than 
others in recipient villages. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Vulnerability to natural disaster is a major barrier to development, and 
augmenting the capacity for effective disaster management is critically important. 
Frequent reports point to an inefficient distribution of disaster relief by uncoordinated 
relief agents who lack pertinent information about the damage. This is not surprising, 
because relief agents give a higher priority to the speed of response than to evidence-
based decision making (de Ville de Goyet, 2008). Only recently has empirical research 
started to shed light on the performance of relief targeting. Morris and Wodon (2003) 
find that among Honduran victims of Hurricane Mitch, the receipt of emergency aid is 
targeted on pre-shock assets, asset loss, and incidence of housing damage, but the amount 
received is not. In Fiji, Takasaki (forthcoming) demonstrates that the allocation of 
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cyclone relief within villages is linked with informal risk sharing (in Ethiopia, Dercon 
and Krishnan, 2005 also find evidence that food aid is shared within the village).  
As time passes, the main actions of disaster management shift from relief to 
recovery and reconstruction, and the allocation of relief, recovery, and reconstruction 
funds becomes more efficient as damage information accumulates and agents’ 
coordination becomes more effective.
1 Probably because of this perception, as well as a 
lack of data, empirical research on targeting reconstruction funds during post-emergency 
periods is lacking. This paper examines the allocation of housing reconstruction funds 
among cyclone victims in rural Fiji. Understanding the performance of targeting 
reconstruction funds is important, but is not a main focus of the paper. My main goal is to 
address a question that has not yet been explored by researchers, but has potential to be 
critically important: Do local elites capture reconstruction funds?  
Elite capture of a particular program occurs when a powerful minority alters the 
nature of the program in their favor. As the participatory or decentralized approach to 
development has become mainstream (World Bank, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004), elite 
capture as its potential drawback has been receiving considerable attention from 
researchers. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) theoretically examine the factors that might 
affect whether elite capture is more likely to occur at the local or national levels, showing 
that higher income inequality results in more local capture. Consistent empirical findings 
have been obtained in community-based programs in Asia and Latin America, such as 
India’s employment generation program (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006), Bangladesh’s 
Food-for-Education Program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), and Ecuador’s Social Fund 
investment projects (Araujo et al., 2008).
2  
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Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue that capture problems are also significant in 
more egalitarian countries in Sub-Saharan Africa because of community imperfections 
entailed in the personalized character of human interactions in small groups: 
In lineage-based societies, local chiefs and elders from dominant lineages are 
ideally positioned to … “capture” the benefits of decentralized development 
programmes or projects. In fact, they may easily respond to new prospects of 
windfall gains by transforming themselves into all-powerful patrons. Instead of 
“father figures” clinging to their traditional duties of redistributing wealth and 
settling conflicts in such a way as to maintain the existing social order, the 
erstwhile elite become greedy individuals who show all the less restraint in 
enriching themselves at the expense of their community as they are actually 
legitimated by outside actors. By virtue of their dominant position, they can thus 
manipulate participatory methods by subtly representing their own interests as 
community concerns expressed in the light of project deliverables. (p. 122) 
 
In Fiji and many other Pacific Island states, kin-based hierarchies play a central role in 
local governance:  
Hierarchy is defined here as the ranking of the elements of a whole (society) in 
relation to the whole. In this sense, the elements that are ranked are social 
categories or positions defined in terms of age, seniority of descent, and gender, 
and the whole in relation to which they are ranked is a social system grounded in 
ritual. Elder is superior to junior, chief to commoner, and male to female. But 
while age, rank, and gender differences entail relations of superiority/inferiority 
among persons, they also create interdependence. . . .  These relations of 
inequality and interdependence (which do not preclude conflict) are expressed and 
reproduced in the practice of everyday life. (Turner, 1992, p.291) 
 
Kin elites may become capturers of reconstruction funds even when such funds are 
strongly targeted toward victims. If elite capture deteriorates the equitability of disaster 
management, policymakers need to pay serious attention to recipient communities. As a 
related study in a different context, Leeson and Sobel (2008) find that disaster relief is 
associated with an increase in public corruption across the United States. 
To empirically examine elite capture, most extant studies on community-based 
development programs rely on measures of consumption, income, or asset inequality with 
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the assumption that power is correlated with wealth. A straightforward alternative is to 
use direct measures of elite status as determinants of benefit allocation. In standard 
household surveys, however, elite status is often unobservable to researchers, and even if 
it is observable, there are too few elites to make a statistical analysis possible. A unique 
feature of the Fijian data is that in each village, households are stratified by their kin 
group (clan) and elite status, and thus rich, direct measures of local elites are available.  
The paper is based on original survey data gathered in 2005 in the same area as 
Takasaki’s (forthcoming) study, but from many more villages and households than his 
original sample collected in 2003. Distinct from this earlier work on the relief allocation 
within the village in the six months after the cyclone, this paper investigates the 
allocation of housing reconstruction funds at three different levels – village, clan, and 
household – over three years. Comparing reconstruction with relief in response to the 
same cyclone allows me to better understand capture problems in disaster management.
3  
The paper examines in which form – receipt, the amount received, or the timing 
of these two – local elites capture reconstruction funds. Examining receipt and the 
amount received separately is important because their determinants can be distinct, as 
shown by Morris and Wodon (2003) for emergency relief (see also Jayne et al., 2002; 
Dercon and Krishnan, 2005 for similar empirical findings on targeting food aid in Africa). 
Strong targeting in receipt and the amount received does not necessarily mean targeting 
in timing: The larger the damage, the earlier the receipt or the greater the amount received 
in early periods. Targeting in timing can be weak or even nonexistent, because 
reconstruction usually takes time and the distribution of scarce funds is often delayed. 
Thus the limited supply of funds during early periods may lead to early capture of receipt 
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or the amount received: Local elites receive benefits earlier or receive greater benefits 
during early periods. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) find early capture of benefits from 
schooling and antipoverty programs by the nonpoor in India.  
Main findings of the paper are summarized as follows. Allocations of housing 
reconstruction funds – both receipt and the amount received – across villages, clans, and 
households are strongly targeted on damage, and accordingly, local elites do not capture 
larger benefits at any level (in any period). A limited supply of funds during early periods, 
however, precludes targeting in timing, resulting in early capture of receipt by local elites 
within the recipient village.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes elite status in 
Fijian society, the sampling design, and the data. Section III provides a description of 
cyclone damage and reconstruction. Descriptive evidence of targeting and elite capture of 
housing reconstruction funds is offered in Sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI 
discusses the econometric specification, which is followed by estimation results in 
Section VII and discussions in Section VIII. The last section concludes.       
II. Elite status and data  
The hierarchical Fijian kin structure is well known among anthropologists: The 
bottom is tokatoka, followed by mataqali, yavusa, and vanua, and all native Fijians 
belong to one tokatoka, which belongs to one mataqali, and so forth (Ravuvu, 1983). 
Vanua ranges over several villages, roughly matching districts, and there is one or a few 
yavusa in a village; mataqali and tokatoka are village sub-groups.  
I define kin-based elite status at the household, mataqali (henceforth called clan), 
and village levels as follows. First, in the village, individuals who hold a traditionally 
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assigned, permanent leadership position in their kin group – yavusa, mataqali, or tokatoka 
– play a major role in the group’s decision making and negotiations among groups (clan 
leaders). Second, a small number of clan leaders are yavusa or mataqali chiefs with 
special social status who assume various traditional duties in the village (no tokatoka 
chiefs exist; village chiefs are shared by some clan leaders and are not necessarily yavusa 
or mataqali chiefs). These chiefs come from only specific mataqali (chief’s clans). Third, 
vanua chiefs who are highly ranked and assume traditional duties across villages are 
available in or originated from selected villages (chief’s villages). Since many vanua 
chiefs live in a city, the data contain a small number of vanua chiefs who share yavusa 
chiefs (i.e., clan leaders). Local elite status is also held by leaders of groups other than kin 
groups in the village, such as church, women’s, and school groups (non-clan leaders). 
Non-clan leadership is neither permanent nor directly related to kinship.
4
In July-September 2005, I conducted a survey among native Fijian households in 
Cakaudrove Province in the northern region of the country.
5 The province has 134 
villages in 16 districts. Households were sampled as follows. First, in each district, 
villages were stratified by chief’s village status; all 15 chief’s villages were sampled, and 
other villages with distinct environmental and economic conditions were intentionally 
chosen. Next, in each village, all tokatoka were sampled. Lastly, in each tokatoka, 
households were stratified by a combination of clan and non-clan leadership status and 
major asset holdings (like shops), and households were randomly sampled in each 
stratum. Overall, the survey covered 906 households, 234 tokatoka, and 146 mataqali in 
43 villages (with no overlap of tokatoka or mataqali across villages). While the data 
     7
represent neither the province nor the nation, the sample villages well capture various 
types of villages in Fiji’s underdeveloped islands. 
In the sample, 19% of households, 17% of clans, and 35% of villages are clan 
leaders, chief’s clans, and chief’s villages, respectively; 10% of households are non-clan 
leaders, and there are non-clan leaders in 55% of clans and in all villages (see Table 1). 
Hence, the present data contain sufficient frequencies of local elites for statistical analysis. 
At the time of interviews, households in the sample earned F$10,972 annual 
income, or F$2,515 per adult equivalent (F$1 = US$.60), on average; cropping, fishing, 
and permanent wage labor accounted for 65%, 11%, and 10% of income, respectively.
6  
III. Cyclone damage and reconstruction 
On 13 January 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern regions of 
the Fiji Islands.
7 According to respondents’ subjective assessments, Ami damaged 62% 
of residents’ dwellings in the sample (panel A of Table 1): 19% and 34% of main houses 
were completely destroyed and partially damaged, respectively; and 54% of households 
experienced damage of independent dwelling units other than the main house, such as the 
kitchen, shower, and toilet (not all households have such units, as such facilities are often 
located inside the main house). The mean value of total dwelling damage, including 
independent units, in the whole sample was F$1,074.
8  
The Red Cross, other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and governments 
provisioned emergency relief. While almost all households received generous food aid 
(30% of their food consumption over six months, on average), as well as seeds for crop 
rehabilitation, primitive tarpaulins – to be used as emergency shelters and for temporary 
dwelling repair – were given to a small proportion of victims (Takasaki, forthcoming).  
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Housing reconstruction programs followed. Construction materials were 
provisioned, and if needed, carpenters were sent to villages to help build new houses 
(villagers helped each other with rebuilding and repairing). In the survey, each household 
was asked whether it received construction materials, and the recipient was asked about 
the year and month of receipt and the monetary value of construction materials received 
(measurement errors in these retrospective data are discussed in Section VI). A quarter of 
households were recipients, and the mean amount in the whole sample was F$685. The 
mean amount among recipients was F$2,821, which is almost the same as the mean value 
of total dwelling damage in the same sub-sample: That is, housing reconstruction funds 
and dwelling damages were balanced among recipients, on average.
9
IV. Targeting 
Household-level targeting  
Housing reconstruction funds were strongly targeted toward victims. Panel A of 
Table 2 compares the receipt of construction materials (of any amount) with the 
incidence of dwelling damage (of any magnitude) among households. While 2% of 
recipients were households that experienced no dwelling damage, 60% of victims with a 
damaged dwelling were not recipients. That is, while the error of inclusion (leakage) is 
very small, the error of exclusion (under-coverage) is very large. While households with 
a completely destroyed main house were targeted (48% of recipients), under-coverage 
was still common among them (35% of such victims were non-recipients) (panel B). 
Thus, the supply of full construction materials for new house building was limited, and 
small provisions were targeted toward victims with a partially damaged main house and 
damaged independent units (42% and 8% of recipients, respectively).  
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Panel A of Table 3 shows the correlations of construction materials – receipt and 
amount received – with cyclone damage in the whole sample. The allocation is strongly 
positively correlated with all damage measures, except for a negative correlation between 
the amount of construction materials received and partial main house damage, the reason 
for which is given below. Panel A of Table 1 shows comparable patterns of recipients and 
non-recipients.   
Targeting in timing 
Provisions of construction materials took time. Figure 1 depicts the numbers of 
households that received construction materials and the mean amounts among recipients 
by quarter (the record is incomplete in the last quarter, 2005-3, when interviews were 
conducted). The numbers of recipients and the amounts received were small during early 
quarters and increased later, since 2004-1 and 2004-4, respectively. That is, housing 
reconstruction programs augmented in scale one year after the disaster, and provisions of 
full construction materials for new house building were further delayed (in 2003-3, only 
one recipient received them). A comparison across years reveals that 58% of recipients 
received construction materials in 2004, and the mean amount received among recipients 
in 2005 is more than two times that in 2003 and 2004.    
Panel B of Table 3 shows correlations of cyclone damage with the receipt of 
construction materials in each year and the amount received in three years and in each 
year, among recipients in the corresponding year(s). Receipt is negatively correlated with 
dwelling damage value and complete main house destruction and positively correlated 
with partial main house damage in 2004; in 2005, opposite correlation patterns hold in a 
statistically significant manner (the results in 2003 are statistically nonsignificant). At the 
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same time, the amounts received are always positively correlated with dwelling damage 
value and complete main house destruction and negatively correlated with partial main 
house damage (the last relationship significantly appeared also in the whole sample 
discussed above). These patterns indicate that households with severer damage received 
construction materials later, not earlier, simply because their supply was limited during 
early periods, while benefit amounts were always strongly targeted on damage.
10  
Clan- and village-level targeting 
Cyclone damage and construction materials at the clan (mataqali) level are 
reported in panel B of Table 1 (all mataqali-level analyses in the paper were repeated at 
the level of tokatoka, a sub-group of mataqali, yielding very similar results). Comparable 
village-level figures appear in panel C. While 88% of clans and all villages experienced 
dwelling damage (i.e., at least one victimized household was located there), 54% of clans 
and 88% of villages, respectively, were recipients (i.e., at least one recipient household 
was located there). Not surprisingly, clan and village means of all damage and 
construction material measures are comparable to the original household-level figures 
reported in panel A.  
Using these clan- and village-level measures, I examine targeting performance at 
the clan and village levels in the same manner as the household-level analysis. 
Corresponding to panel B of Table 3, I consider the years of the earliest receipt – this 
dummy for each year takes one if a first-recipient household in the clan/village appears in 
that year – and the amount received among recipient clans/villages – with at least one 
recipient household – in each year. While by definition the former dummies for the 
earliest receipt are mutually exclusive across years, dummies for receipt corresponding to 
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the latter recipient clans/villages are not, because different households in the same 
clan/village can be recipients in different years. Qualitatively the same results as those 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 are obtained (results not shown); as an exception, clans and 
villages with severer damage did not necessarily receive construction materials later (the 
results are statistically nonsignificant).  
Synthesis 
To sum up, while targeting in receipt and the amount received was strong at the 
village, clan, and household levels, limited supply of reconstruction funds resulted in 
nonsignificant under-coverage and precluded targeting in timing. This indicates 
considerable room for early capture by local elites.  
V.  Elite capture 
Descriptive evidence of elite capture is limited to the following. First, as shown in 
panel B of Table 1, chief’s clans and clans with non-clan leaders are more likely to be 
recipients (comparable results are obtained from correlation analyses at the clan level and 
by comparing the proportion of recipients in these leaders’ clans with that of other clans). 
Second, as suggested from panel B of Table 3, the amounts received in 2003 and 2004 
(and in 2003-2005) among recipients are significantly larger for clan leaders than non-
leaders (comparable results are obtained by comparing the means of the amounts 
conditional on recipient between these two). There is no statistically significant 
difference in receipt, however, between clan leaders and others in any year, and neither 
receipt nor the amount received significantly differs between non-clan leaders and others. 
Clans’ elite status does not significantly differentiate the years of the earliest receipt and 
the amount received among recipient clans in each year, and qualitatively the same 
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results hold at the village level (results not shown). To sum up, it appears that chief’s 
clans and non-clan leaders’ clans are capturers, but not early ones, in the allocation of 
recipients, and clan leaders are early capturers of larger benefits, but not receipt of 
benefits.    
These patterns could be spurious, however. Let me consider the clan-level 
capturing to illustrate why. First, chiefs’ clans and non-clan leaders’ clans are positively 
correlated with each other (the correlation is .27 with a 1% statistical significance). Only 
one of them may be a real capturer. Second, these two leaders’ clans can be correlated 
with other factors that determine receipt of benefits. An obvious example is clan size: 
Larger clans with more victims are more likely to be recipient clans, and these leaders’ 
clans tend to be larger than other clans. Systematically controlling for other determinants, 
which is a task in the remaining sections, is thus crucial to identify elite capture.  
VI. Econometric specification  
Empirical models 
I conjecture that allocation of construction materials y is determined not only by 
cyclone damage X (targeting) but also by social status Z (elite capture). I employ the 
following reduced-form models at the village (v), clan (g), and household (i) levels:  
v v v v v e W Z X y + + + + = 1 1 1 1 δ γ β α ,        ( 1 )    
g g g g g e V W Z X y + + + + + = 2 2 2 2 δ γ β α ,       ( 2 )    
i i i i i e V W Z X y + + + + + = 3 3 3 3 δ γ β α ,       ( 3 )    
where Wv, Wg, and Wi, respectively, are other village, clan, and household characteristics 
that affect the allocation; V is village dummies; and ev, eg, and ei are error terms. Whether 
victims reconstruct or repair their dwellings without receiving construction materials 
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certainly affects the allocations of reconstruction funds (see note 9), but this endogenous 
decision does not appear as an explanatory variable in the reduced-form equations (1)-(3) 
(examining self-reconstruction is not a focus of the paper). As village dummies fully 
control for village-level factors, including total construction materials allocated to the 
village, equations (2) and (3), respectively, focus on the allocations across clans and 
households within the village. I also estimate equation (3), replacing village dummies V 
with clan dummies G, which fully control for clan-level factors. If household-level 
factors are a driving force, then significant findings in the original equation (3), which 
does not control for clan-level factors – both observable and unobservable ones – must be 
robust to this alternative specification focusing on allocations within the clan. 
I conduct two analyses, one ignoring the timing of receipt and the other 
highlighting it. The first analysis estimates the determinants of receipt in the three-year 
period, 2003-2005, using probit for the whole sample and those of log of the amount 
received among recipients using Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) (the village and clan 
means of the amount received is used in equations 1 and 2, respectively). This hurdle 
model is commonly used in previous studies (Jayne et al., 2002; Dercon and Krishnan, 
2005).
11 Targeting performance and elite capture, respectively, are measured by positive 
βj and γj (or their positive elements if they are a vector);
12 if the allocation corresponds to 
only damage, then γj and δj should be zero.  
The second analysis employs the same hurdle model in the first year, 2003, and in 
the first two years, 2003-2004. At the village and clan levels, the year of the earliest 
receipt and the recipients in the corresponding year(s) defined above are considered. For 
example, the dummy dependent variable for 2003-2004 takes one if at least one recipient 
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household in a clan appears in the first two years, and the corresponding amount equation 
is estimated for clans with at least one recipient household in the same period. Targeting 
in timing and early capture, respectively, are measured by positive βj and γj with greater 
magnitudes than those for the three-year period.  
I also estimate the determinants of the year of receipt – 2003, 2004, or 2005 – 
among recipients using ordered probit (the year of the earliest receipt in the village- and 
clan-level analyses). As the greater the dependent variable, the later the receipt, negative 
βj and γj, respectively, indicate targeting in timing and early capture of receipt. While the 
probit model shows whether elites are more likely to be recipients during early periods, 
the ordered-probit model examines the order of receipts among recipients.
13  
While retrospective errors in the receipt of construction materials should be 
minimal and those in the year of receipt should be also small (those in the month of 
receipt could be significant), those in the amount received could be considerable. A key 
question is whether errors are correlated with covariates. In particular, households with 
more damage may have felt that the amount received was too small, causing a downward 
bias in estimated impacts of the damage. This means that estimated positive βj in the 
amount equation (suggesting good targeting) should be qualitatively robust. 
Covariates 
Three groups of covariates – cyclone damage X, social status Z, and other 
characteristics W – are measured as follows. At the household level, Xi is captured by the 
log value of total dwelling damage or two dummies for a completely destroyed and 
partially damaged main house. The former damage measure is comprehensive, as it 
covers total damage of all dwelling units, but its measurement errors could be 
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considerable and systematic. Although the latter damage measure does not capture 
independent units owned by some households, retrospective errors in the damage status 
of each main house reported by individual households are minimal, because relief 
officers used the same three categories for their damage assessments, and thus the 
damage status of each house was common knowledge among villagers. As such, 
qualitatively similar results of these two damage measures give me confidence about the 
findings’ robustness. Xv is measured by the village mean of total damage value or two 
variables for the proportions of households with completely destroyed and partially 
damaged main houses in the village; Xg is measured analogously. When main house 
damage measures are used, βj (which is a vector) should indicate a greater marginal effect 
for complete damage than partial damage.  
Social status Zv, Zg, and Zi, respectively, are measured by a dummy for chief’s 
villages, two dummies for chief’s clans and non-clan leaders’ clans, and two dummies for 
clan leaders and non-clan leaders defined above.       
Village characteristics Wv include village size and access, measured by the total 
number of households in the village (in population) and travel time to a market (log), 
respectively; only clan size, measured by the total number of households in the clan (in 
population), is considered for clan characteristics Wg. While clan size should positively 
affect the allocation in the village, as discussed above, how village size matters is 
ambiguous: Larger villages may be prioritized or they instead may be given a lower 
priority with a limited supply of funds. While geographical location certainly determines 
the delivery of emergency relief, whether this is also the case for reconstruction funds 
during post-emergency periods is an empirical question. In equations (2) and (3), all 
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geographical factors are captured by village dummies. Household characteristics Wi are 
captured by asset holdings and demographic factors in a standard manner.
14 If the 
allocation is determined by targeting on housing damage and social status potentially 
causing elite capture, as conjectured here, household characteristics should not matter.  
VII.  Estimation results  
Estimation results of the models with dwelling damage value and main house 
damage are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. In each table, results of the 
allocations across villages, clans, and households are shown in panels A, B, and C, 
respectively. In each table, columns (1)-(3), respectively, show probit results for receipts 
in 2003, 2003-2004, and 2003-2005 (marginal effects at means are reported); columns (4) 
and (5), respectively, show OLS results for the amounts received among recipients in 
2003-2004 and 2003-2005 (the analysis in 2003 is infeasible because of the small number 
of observations); and column (6) gives ordered probit results for the year of receipt 
among recipients.
15 I first discuss targeting and then elite capture and other factors.  
Targeting 
Targeting performance is very consistent with earlier descriptive findings. When 
the timing of receipt is ignored (columns 3 and 5), the receipt and the amount received 
are strongly targeted toward more severely affected victims, according to both dwelling 
damage value and main house damage, at the village, clan, and household levels. Almost 
all results are statistically significant at least at a 5% significance level.
16 Allocations 
strongly respond to complete main house destruction. At the household level, for example, 
the probability of being a recipient is higher by .72 and the amount received (conditional 
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on receipt) is 261% larger among households with a completely destroyed main house 
than others.
17  
There is no strong evidence of targeting in timing (columns 1, 2, 4, and 6). 
Overall fitness of the models of the receipt in 2003 and of the year of receipt is weak at 
the village and clan levels. Only in receipt at the village level do the marginal effects of 
damage decrease over time, and correspondingly, the estimated coefficients of the 
damage in the year-of-receipt equation are negative, but not statistically significant. 
According to both the receipt and year-of-receipt equations, clans with more severely 
affected victims are rather late recipients.
18   
Elite capture 
Consistent with the earlier descriptive finding at the clan level, when clan size is 
not controlled for, the probability of receipt is significantly higher among the chief’s 
clans than other clans (results not shown); once clan size is controlled for, however, this 
result loses statistical significance and the estimated marginal effect decreases (column 3 
in panel B of Table 4). The former result is thus biased upward for the reason discussed 
above. A new finding is that the chief’s clans strongly affect the receipt in 2003-2004 – 
about .40 marginal effects with a near 10% statistical significance (column 2). At the 
same time, chief’s villages do not significantly influence across-villages allocations.  
Two new findings at the household level are obtained: (1) the probability of 
receipt in 2003-2004 is higher by .10-.12 among clan leaders than others, and this pattern 
is not statistically significant in 2003 or 2003-2005 (panel C of Table 4); and (2) 
according to the year-of-receipt equation among recipients, the probability of receipt in 
2003 and 2005 is higher and lower by about .14-.15 and .12-.13, respectively, among clan 
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leaders than non-leaders (column 6 in panel C of Table 6). There are no other significant 
results indicating capturing in receipt or the timing of receipt, and when I estimate 
equation (3) with clan dummies, these two significant results hold, confirming that 
household-level elite status is a driving force. Hence, individual clan leadership matters 
in across-households allocations within villages and clans.  
Consistent with the earlier descriptive finding, the clan leader dummy exhibits a 
positive impact on the amount received in 2003-2004; however, this is statistically 
significant only in models with dwelling damage value and the result loses statistical 
significance in equation (3) with clan dummies, indicating that household-level elite 
status is not a strong determinant. According to the regression results, traditional local 
elites do not capture larger amounts at any level of allocation in any period. Nor is there 
evidence of capturing by non-traditional elites in any form of allocation – at the clan or 
household level – over time.  
To sum up, elite capture exists in two forms: (1) chief’s clans, but not non-clan 
leaders’ clans, are early capturers of receipt in the village; and (2) clan leaders are early 
capturers of receipt of benefits, but not larger benefits, in the village and the clan. Note 
that as there are clan leaders in most clans, the latter household-level capturing is not 
necessarily a primary cause of the former clan-level capturing. These patterns differ from 
earlier descriptive findings: The descriptive evidence of capturing by non-clan leaders’ 
clans is an artifact caused by their positive correlation with chief’s clans; chief’s clans are 
early capturers, as clan leaders are; and clan leaders are capturers of receipt of benefits, as 
chief’s clans are.  
Other factors 
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Findings about village, clan, and household characteristics are as follows (results 
not shown). While village access does not influence the allocation, smaller villages are 
more likely to be recipients in 2003-2004, but not in 2003-2005 (with .07-.13 marginal 
effects in magnitude). As expected, larger clans are more likely to be recipients in 2003-
2004 and 2003-2005 (with .28-.40 marginal effects); the results are statistically 
significant, however, only in the models with main house damage. Lastly, almost no 
household characteristics are strong determinants in any form of allocations.
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VIII.  Discussions  
To better interpret the findings on elite capture in the last section, this section 
compares the findings with those regarding emergency relief. Recall that with a large 
supply of food aid, almost all households are recipients. Takasaki (forthcoming) shows 
that neither clan leaders nor chief’s clans capture food aid, even though crop damage is 
not very observable to other households and everyone demands food aid, and thus there 
exist significant room and demand for capture. This is because in a closely knit kin 
society, capturing relief allocated as part of risk sharing can greatly deteriorate the 
capturer’s reputation.  
In contrast to emergency food aid, the following relationships hold for 
construction materials. First, as only households with a damaged dwelling demand 
construction materials, capturing by non-victims is limited. Indeed, leakage was minimal 
(Takasaki, forthcoming shows a similar pattern in the receipt of tarpaulins). Second, 
information problems in housing damage among villagers and relief officers are very 
small. This precludes local elites from capturing larger benefits in any period, because the 
amount provisioned can be well determined based on the damage. Third, a limited supply 
     20
of construction materials gives rise to significant under-coverage, especially during early 
periods, making considerable room for the early capture of the receipt of benefits.  
Whether local elites actually capture benefits earlier depends on their benefit-cost 
calculation of doing so. Benefits are much higher for receiving construction materials 
than for receiving food aid (the mean value of construction materials received per adult 
equivalent among recipients is 6.5 times the mean value of food aid received per capita, 
as reported by Takasaki, forthcoming). Benefits peak in 2004 when the amount 
provisioned – especially provisions for new house building – started to augment. The 
social costs of capturing can be also high, but those of manipulating the timing of receipt 
by one year or so are much smaller than manipulating the recipients themselves. 
Traditional local elites can exercise their power most within the village, while non-
traditional elites have no such power.
20 As a result, early capture of the receipt of benefits 
by traditional elites emerges in the recipient village.  
IX. Conclusion  
This paper examined the allocation of natural disaster reconstruction funds among 
cyclone victims in rural Fiji. Using original survey data with rich, direct measures of 
traditional, kin-based elite status, the paper investigated whether and how local elites 
capture housing construction materials during post-emergency periods when good 
information about the damage is available. With effective targeting in both receipt and 
the amount received at the village, clan, and household levels, local elites do not capture 
larger benefits at any level. More severely affected victims are not early recipients, 
however, because the supply of reconstruction funds is limited during early periods. This 
invites early capture within the recipient village: Clan leaders and elite clans receive 
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benefits earlier. At the same time, there is no evidence of capturing by non-traditional 
elites of village organizations other than kin groups. Descriptive results of targeting well 
match regression results, except in the instance of elite capture.      
Policy implications for disaster management are the following. First, good data 
and information management for effective targeting (Amin and Goldstein, 2008) greatly 
help preclude elite capture. Second, timely provision of sufficient reconstruction funds is 
crucial not only to better support disaster victims, but also to reduce early capture by 
local elites. Third, in kin-based societies like Fiji, traditional elite status is likely to be a 
source of power fuelling elite capture, and not only individual elites but also elite kin 
groups can be capturers in the recipient community. Fourth, identifying elite capture is 
more difficult than evaluating targeting performance, and thus it is likely to require 
careful econometric analysis of direct measures of elite status. Capture problems in 
disaster management may be also prevalent in other kin-based societies, such as those in 





1 Post-disaster management consists of three phases – relief, early recovery, and recovery 
and reconstruction (de Ville de Goyet, 2008). Relief emphasizes the urgent but temporary 
nature of the assistance, such as search and rescue, evacuation, food and water 
distribution, temporary sanitation and health care, temporary shelter, and restoration of 
the access to transport. Relief is mostly a humanitarian response by nongovernmental 
organizations and the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs. Development agents, such as bilateral donors, the UN Development Programme, 
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and the World Bank, are primarily concerned about recovery and reconstruction, aiming 
at restoring heavy infrastructure and the normal life of business with a long-term vision. 
Early recovery consists of continuing basic needs support, providing mental health care, 
restoring education, and restoring livelihoods:  
It is often assumed that early recovery implies emergency or temporary measures. 
However, early recovery is gradually coming to include permanent solutions such 
as the construction of housing or water systems and the establishment of primary 
health care centers or schools staffed by local people, thereby blurring the 
distinction between delayed relief and reconstruction. Emergency activities 
undertaken by relief agencies following hurricanes or earthquakes, which used to 
be run for only a few weeks or months, are now spanning years. (de Ville de 
Goyet, 2008, pp.31-32, emphasis added)  
 
2 To the contrary, Yamauchi (forthcoming) finds no evidence of elite capture in 
Indonesia’s anti-poverty program, nor does elite capture appear in India’s credit and 
agricultural minikit programs (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).  
3 Better understanding the effectiveness of disaster management is of great importance in 
small island states (Bertram, 1986), as researchers criticize their increasing dependency 
on emergency aid from donors and the associated deterioration of indigenous 
mechanisms (e.g., Campbell, 1984). In contrast to extensive anthropological studies, 
economic studies of the Pacific region based on household survey data are greatly scarce. 
4 Non-clan leaders also include gatekeepers (turaga ni koro), who handle most matters in 
connection with the local government. Gatekeepers receive information and materials 
from the government and NGOs, distribute them to villagers, and coordinate village 
meetings. While gatekeepers are deliverers of disaster relief, whether and how they affect 
allocation decisions are unknown. 
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5 The province is mainly located on Vanua Levu Island and Taveuni Island, the second- 
and third-largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, 
Viti Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses 
are situated. While Fiji is divided almost evenly between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians, 
this study focuses on the former. 
6 Almost all households employ traditional farming practices, using no mechanized 
equipment or animal traction and limited purchased inputs to produce taro, cassava, 
coconut, and kava plant (locally known as yaqona, a pepper plant used to make a local 
beverage kava which is a dominant symbol in Fijian culture, Turner, 1986). Land is 
communally owned by mataqali, is privately used, and by law cannot be sold (about 83% 
of the country’s total land is communal). Most households engage in subsistence fishing 
using lines and hooks, simple spear guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially 
oriented fishermen use boats with engines, along with more valuable nets. Some 
households engage in permanent wage labor, especially in the public and tourism sectors. 
7 The northern region is much less prone to being hit by cyclones than other regions of 
the country, and Ami was the only cyclone in the northern region from 1991 through 
2005 (McKenzie et al., 2005). 
8 The total cyclone damage across the country is estimated at F$104 million, of which 
dwelling damage is F$22 million and crop damage is F$40 million (National Disaster 
Management Office, 2003). Fourteen people were killed. In the sample villages, no 
casualties and very limited injuries and illnesses caused by the cyclone were reported.  
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9 The provisions of construction materials greatly helped reconstruction as follows (a 
systematic analysis of impacts of housing reconstruction programs is beyond the scope of 
the paper). I focus on new main house building, for which information is available 
(information of repairing is lacking). In the whole sample, 9% of households built a new 
house and almost all of them had experienced dwelling damage, especially complete 
destruction of their main house; among households with a completely destroyed main 
house, more than half of recipients built a new house and 20% of non-recipients did so 
(results not shown). Thus, the provisions of construction materials for new house building 
were insufficient and constructing a new house without receiving them (i.e., self-
reconstruction) was relatively common. 
10 Correspondingly, among recipients, new main house building is positively correlated 
with the amount of construction materials received, but not receipt itself, in each year; in 
the whole sample, new main house building is positively correlated with cyclone damage 
and both receipt and the amount received (Table 3).  
11 An alternative sample selection model is infeasible with these data, which lack the 
identifying instruments required to credibly estimate the selection equation. 
12 If the allocation of construction materials is part of informal risk sharing among 
villagers and clan members, β3 is generally unsigned, because the opposite allocation rule 
is possible when households that suffered more receive greater net private transfers, as 
Takasaki (forthcoming) finds for emergency food aid. It is most unlikely, however, that 
private transfers outweigh provisions of construction materials.  
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13 At the household and clan levels, respectively, I repeated all these analyses for 
households with a damaged dwelling and clans containing at least one such victimized 
household. In this way, I can examine capture problems as well as targeting performance 
among eligible potential recipients. All results of this sub-sample analysis are almost the 
same as what are presented below based on the whole sample. Of course, because of the 
minimal error of inclusion found above, recipients in the victim sub-sample are almost 
the same as those in the whole sample analysis.  
14 Household characteristics include land holdings (log), fishing capital (log), a dummy 
for secondary education among adults (capturing human capital), household adult 
equivalent size (log), proportions of children and elderly (capturing labor resources), the 
age of household head (log), and a dummy for female head. All of these are measured at 
the time of interviews. It is better to use measures before the cyclone or right after the 
cyclone, but such data are lacking. In particular, land holding and fishing capital can be 
endogenous, because the receipt of construction materials can alter household investment 
decisions. To address this problem, I estimate models excluding these two assets, finding 
very similar results on all remaining variables. For the same reason, income is not 
controlled for, though household characteristics still control for permanent income. Note 
also that village dummies control for income inequality (also in equation 2).  
15 Equation (2) can be applied only to villages in which there exist across-clans variations 
in the receipt in the period of interest in the probit and the years of receipt among 
recipient clans in the ordered probit; without such variations, village dummies perfectly 
predict them. Analogously, equation (3) can be applied only to villages with sufficient 
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across-households variations. Accordingly, the numbers of observations for these 
analyses greatly decrease. The numbers of observations for the analyses conditional on 
receipt – OLS and ordered probit – further decline, and this is especially so in 2003.      
16 The result of receipt at the village level is weak, because non-recipient villages are 
uncommon (only 5 out of 43 villages). Indeed, the result is stronger in 2003-2004, when 
non-recipient villages are more common.  
17 At the clan level, a .1 increase in the proportion of households with completely 
destroyed main houses in the clan augments the probability of receipt by .31 and the 
amount received by 27%; and the comparable marginal effect on the amount received at 
the village level is 71%. In both the receipt and the amount received at any level of 
allocation, partial main house damage exhibits much smaller impacts than complete 
destruction. While marginal effects of dwelling damage value on receipt are small, those 
on the amount received are large – its 10% increase augments the amount received by 
18%, 7.8%, and 4.8% at the village, clan, and household levels, respectively. 
18 This result is not strong. A 10% increase in dwelling damage value reduces the 
probability of receipt in 2003 by .015 and increases that in 2004 and 2005 by .010 
and .004, respectively, and the result is not statistically significant in the model with main 
house damage. Consistent with the earlier descriptive finding, a similar pattern is found at 
the household level, but in equation (3) with clan dummies, the estimated coefficient for 
dwelling damage value in the year-of-receipt equation loses statistical significance, 
indicating that household-level damage is not a driving force. 
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19 The only exception is that households with more children (in proportion) tend to 
receive larger amounts of construction materials in 2003-2004 and 2003-2005. Because 
household size, as well as other demographic factors, is separately controlled for, this 
result suggests that the allocations favor children.  
20 Non-clan leaders’ clans, not non-clan leaders themselves, capture emergency food aid 
provisioned to their groups (Takasaki, forthcoming). Because construction materials were 
not provisioned to village organizations, non-clan leaders could not use the traditional kin 
structure for capturing, as they did for food aid.   
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Clan leader dummy 0.19 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.412
Non-clan leader dummy 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.34) 0.055
Damaged dwelling dummy 0.62 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) 0.98 (0.15) 0.000
Completely destroyed main house dummy 0.19 (0.39) 0.09 (0.28) 0.48 (0.50) 0.000
Partially damaged main house dummy 0.34 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.42 (0.50) 0.003
Damaged independent units dummy 0.53 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.86 (0.35) 0.000
Total dwelling damage (F$) 1074 (2138) 466 (1160) 2881 (3134) 0.000
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.25 (0.43) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Construction materials received (F$) 685 (1983) 0 (0) 2821 (3191) 0.000
New main house building dummy 0.09 (0.3) 0.03 (0.2) 0.28 (0.5) 0.000
No. observations 903 676 227
B. Clan
Chief's clan dummy 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.31) 0.23 (0.42) 0.049
Non-clan leaders dummy 0.55 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47) 0.001
Damaged dwelling dummy 0.88 (0.32) 0.75 (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 0.000
Proportion of damaged dwelling 0.59 (0.32) 0.41 (0.34) 0.73 (0.21) 0.000
Proportion of completely destroyed main houses 0.18 (0.23) 0.06 (0.12) 0.27 (0.26) 0.000
Proportion of partially damaged main houses 0.32 (0.28) 0.28 (0.30) 0.34 (0.26) 0.189
Proportion of damaged independent units 0.49 (0.31) 0.34 (0.32) 0.62 (0.25) 0.000
Clan mean of total dwelling damage (F$) 994 (1165) 352 (539) 1538 (1274) 0.000
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.54 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Clan mean of construction materials received (F$) 680 (1366) 0 (0) 1257 (1654) 0.000
Proportion of new main house building 0.08 (0.2) 0.01 (0.1) 0.15 (0.2) 0.000
No. observations 146 67 79
C. Village
Chief's village dummy 0.35 (0.48) 0.40 (0.55) 0.34 (0.48) 0.804
Non-clan leaders dummy 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Damaged dwelling dummy 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Proportion of damaged dwelling 0.64 (0.21) 0.37 (0.24) 0.68 (0.18) 0.001
Proportion of completely destroyed main houses 0.21 (0.16) 0.07 (0.08) 0.23 (0.16) 0.031
Proportion of partially damaged main houses 0.34 (0.15) 0.26 (0.15) 0.35 (0.14) 0.162
Proportion of damaged independent units 0.55 (0.21) 0.33 (0.22) 0.58 (0.19) 0.009
Village mean of total dwelling damage (F$) 1160 (771) 287 (203) 1275 (744) 0.006
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.88 (0.32) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Village mean of construction materials received (F$) 775 (849) 0 (0) 877 (852) 0.006
Proportion of new main house building 0.10 (0.1) 0.02 (0.0) 0.12 (0.1) 0.028
No. observations 43 5 38
Table 1. Means of elite status, housing damage, construction materials, and reconstruction by receipt.
Non-recipients Recipients
Note - Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Mean test results with a 5% significance level are bolded.
All




A. Targeting on dwelling damage.
Non-receipt Receipt Total
Undamaged 338 5 343
99% 1% 100%
5 0 %2 %3 8 %
Damaged 338 222 560
60% 40% 100%
50% 98% 62%
Total 676 227 903
75% 25% 100%
100% 100% 100%
B. Targeting on main house damage.
Non-receipt Receipt Total
Undamaged 404 22 426
95% 5% 100%
60% 10% 47%
Partially damaged 213 96 309
69% 31% 100%
32% 42% 34%
Receipt of construction materials
Receipt of construction materials
Table 2. Targeting of construction materials among households.
Completely destroyed 59 109 168
35% 65% 100%
9% 48% 19%
Total 676 227 903
75% 25% 100%
100% 100% 100%
Note - In each cell of panels A and B, the frequency, the proportion of 
recipient status (in rows), and the proportion of damage category (in 







































0.491 0.438 0.099 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
0.616 0.612 -0.164 0.611 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.473 0.518 -0.149 0.381 0.536 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.014 -0.027 -0.066 -0.027 0.043 -0.021 1.000
(0.687) (0.420) (0.047) (0.412) (0.198) (0.531)
0.048 0.035 -0.014 0.064 0.049 -0.007 0.017 1.000
(0.149) (0.299) (0.674) (0.055) (0.147) (0.838) (0.601)
B. Recipient sample
-0.061 -0.102 0.106 -0.025 -0.040 -0.027
(0.361) (0.130) (0.114) (0.706) (0.556) (0.689)
-0.199 -0.177 0.140 -0.029 0.100 0.023
(0.003) (0.008) (0.036) (0.670) (0.135) (0.734)
0.290 0.302 -0.263 0.057 -0.081 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.394) (0.228) (0.979)
0.545 0.690 -0.552 0.504 0.142 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.778)
0.677 0.579 -0.426 0.501 0.345 -0.044
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.032) (0.790)
0.528 0.693 -0.555 0.561 0.169 0.030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.737)
0.390 0.619 -0.455 0.409 0.081 0.025
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.581) (0.865)
Note - p-values are shown in parentheses. Results with a 5% significance level are bolded. 
Non-clan leader dummy
Amount of construction materials (F$)
New main house building dummy
Dwelling damage value (F$)
Completely destroyed main house dummy
Construction materials receipt dummy
Clan leader dummy
Partially damaged main house dummy
Construction materials received among 2003 
recipients (F$)
Construction materials received among 2004 
recipients (F$)
Construction materials received among 2005 
recipients (F$)
2003 construction materials receipt dummy 
among recipients
2004 construction materials receipt dummy 
among recipients
2005 construction materials receipt dummy 
among recipients
Construction materials received among 
recipients (F$)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.230 ** 0.046 ** 0.025 ** 1.279 *** 1.784 *** -0.391
(0.100) (0.081) (0.051) (0.283) (0.181) (0.278)
0.015 -0.009 -0.020 0.025 0.242 0.178
(0.170) (0.027) (0.042) (0.495) (0.312) (0.502)
-26.4 -9.5 -7.2 -32.5
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.176 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.573
0.107 0.542 0.533 0.358 0.702 0.061
43 43 43 35 38 38
0.071 0.168 *** 0.380 *** 0.908 *** 0.781 *** 0.394 *
(0.049) (0.055) (0.259) (0.257) (0.130) (0.217)
0.132 0.406 0.315 -0.803 -0.165 -1.048
(0.257) (0.236) (0.274) (0.679) (0.536) (0.737)
0.100 -0.209 0.016 0.823 0.370 -0.709
(0.160) (0.224) (0.253) (0.485) (0.356) (0.456)
-32.1 -27.0 -22.5 -37.9
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.799 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.131
0.167 0.450 0.573 0.762 0.813 0.255
58 71 76 49 61 51
0.021 *** 0.062 *** 0.082 *** 0.485 *** 0.479 *** 0.095 *
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.104) (0.075) (0.057)
0.007 0.102 ** 0.030 0.516 0.230 -0.514 *
(0.031) (0.054) (0.046) (0.320) (0.267) (0.267)
0.014 0.026 0.051 0.127 -0.060 0.003
(0.035) (0.048) (0.054) (0.345) (0.290) (0.282)
-111.7 -267.5 -270.3 -150.8
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.187 0.311 0.421 0.525 0.532 0.200


















Non-clan leaders' clan 
dummy
Non-clan leader dummy






*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Columns (1)-(3) are marginal effects at means in probit 
estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Columns (4)-(5) are OLS estimates conditional on receipt with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Column (6) is ordered probit estimates conditional on receipt with standard errors in 
parenthesis. Other controls which are not shown here are village characteristics in panel A, clan characteristics in 
panel B, household characteristics in panel C, village dummies in panels B and C, and constant in columns (4)-(6).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.182 ** 0.498 ** 0.169 6.297 *** 7.258 *** -1.731
(0.587) (0.448) (0.302) (1.474) (1.152) (1.432)
0.969 * 0.248 0.075 0.305 -2.380 -1.652
(0.566) (0.319) (0.161) (2.111) (1.954) (1.494)
-0.002 -0.036 -0.027 0.013 0.256 0.283
(0.170) (0.059) (0.048) (0.474) (0.411) (0.496)
-26.1 -12.0 -9.1 -32.3
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.240 0.004 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.653
0.114 0.420 0.413 0.358 0.564 0.067
43 43 43 35 38 38
0.082 2.040 *** 3.133 *** 2.664 * 2.706 *** 1.288
(0.413) (0.765) (1.020) (1.453) (0.980) (1.212)
0.989 ** 0.440 0.668 0.434 0.191 -1.532
(0.429) (0.351) (0.408) (1.475) (0.967) (1.056)
0.414 0.393 0.348 -0.450 -0.164 -1.525 *
(0.253) (0.218) (0.201) (0.819) (0.642) (0.817)
0.010 -0.319 -0.197 0.725 0.365 -0.779
(0.173) (0.211) (0.216) (0.561) (0.429) (0.497)
-29.9 -27.4 -27.8 -36.5
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.575 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.093
0.224 0.441 0.471 0.711 0.752 0.283
58 71 76 49 61 51
0.199 *** 0.507 *** 0.715 *** 2.686 *** 2.610 *** 0.510
(0.068) (0.058) (0.043) (0.338) (0.271) (0.350)
0.134 *** 0.344 *** 0.384 *** 0.834 *** 0.728 *** -0.139
(0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.301) (0.257) (0.359)
0.016 0.119 ** 0.056 0.570 * 0.306 -0.558 **
(0.039) (0.056) (0.053) (0.309) (0.276) (0.271)
0.024 0.056 0.081 0.359 0.165 0.050
(0.044) (0.053) (0.059) (0.322) (0.247) (0.283)
-116.4 -288.2 -299.2 -147.4
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.152 0.258 0.360 0.634 0.633 0.218





*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Columns (1)-(3) are marginal effects at means in probit 
estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Columns (4)-(5) are OLS estimates conditional on receipt with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Column (6) is ordered probit estimates conditional on receipt with standard errors in 
parenthesis. Other controls which are not shown here are village characteristics in panel A, clan characteristics in 
panel B, household characteristics in panel C, village dummies in panels B and C, and constant in columns (4)-(6).
A. Village.
Proportion of partially 
damaged main houses
Proportion of partially 
damaged main houses
Partially damaged main 
house dummy
No. observations










Non-clan leaders' clan 
dummy
Non-clan leader dummy
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No. of recipients Mean amount of construction materials among recipients
 
   